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Abstract
Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying
their ﬁnal bid price. Using this traditional deﬁnition, no ascending price auction can
achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in
the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this deﬁnition by allowing discounts to
buyers from the ﬁnal price of the auction (or alternatively, calculating the discounts
dynamically during the auction) while still maintaining a single price path. Using
a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and
suﬃcient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we deﬁne a
broad class of ascending price combinatorial auctions in which truthful bidding by
buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium. Any auction in this class achieves the VCG
outcome and ex post eﬃciency for general valuations. We deﬁne two speciﬁc auctions
in this class by generalizing two known auctions in the literature [11, 24].
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11 Introduction
Ascending price auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counterparts in practical set-
tings [10, 9, 26]. In the context of selling a single item, the ascending price English auction
shares the economic eﬃciency of the sealed-bid second-price Vickrey auction [31] for private
value models.
The sealed-bid Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [31, 8, 15] generalizes the Vick-
rey auction to combinatorial auctions [29, 30] with multiple items and general (private)
non-additive valuations and retains its ex post eﬃciency and dominant-strategy incentive-
compatibility properties. Taken together, the economic properties of the VCG mechanism
and the practical beneﬁts of an ascending price auction have generated interest in designing
eﬃcient ascending price combinatorial auctions, achieving the outcome of the VCG mech-
anism. Several papers have addressed this issue for restricted valuation domains: for the
one-to-one assignment problem by Demange et al. [13], for homogeneous items with non-
increasing marginal valuations by Ausubel [2], for heterogeneous valuations with gross sub-
stitutes valuations by Ausubel and Milgrom [3] and de Vries et al. [11].
For a general private valuations model, i.e., with no externalities and free disposal but
no other restrictions on valuations (such as requirements that items are substitutes of each
other), there is a negative result due to de Vries et al. [11]. They show that gross substitutes
valuations are almost the largest valuation domain for which an ascending price auction can
achieve the VCG outcome. Of course, this negative result depends on how an ascending
price auction is deﬁned. These authors adopted a deﬁnition in which the auction should
have a single price path and the buyers should pay the ﬁnal price in this price path. Unlike
an earlier deﬁnition of an ascending price auction, due to Gul and Stacchetti [16], they did
not restrict prices to item prices but allowed a non-anonymous (i.e., personalized for every
buyer) and non-linear (i.e., non-additive over items) price path.
To overcome this impossibility, one needs to relax the deﬁnition of an ascending price
auction. One possible relaxation is to allow multiple price paths in an auction 1. Still in
the restricted case of gross substitutes valuations, Ausubel [1] maintains multiple price paths
and is able to maintain simple anonymous and linear prices for each price path. Combining
information from all price paths, Ausubel’s auction includes an incremental protocol which
determines VCG payments of buyers upon termination. This idea is further generalized by
de Vries et al. [11], who show that their auction can be run multiple times, once for every
buyer, to calculate the VCG payments of buyers for general valuations.
The use of multiple price paths in these auctions requires each buyer to bid on price paths
which are only used to calculate payment of a speciﬁc buyer and serve no other purpose.
This is not appealing in practice because buyers have no incentive to participate in such
price paths. Besides, introducing multiple price paths creates overhead for buyers to bid in
1A price path is a sequence of increasing or decreasing prices. Multiple price path means multiple such
sequences. These price paths may be run simultaneously or sequentially one after the other.
2an auction. It also has less transparency and simplicity than a single price path auction. For
this reason, the following question merits research and is the focus of this paper:
Is there a relaxation of the traditional deﬁnition of ascending price auctions which
maintains a single price path and still terminates with the VCG outcome for
general valuation proﬁles in an ex post Nash equilibrium?
In pursuit of an answer to this question, we explore an alternative relaxation of the
deﬁnition of ascending price auctions in de Vries et al. [11] that maintains a single price
path. We allow the ﬁnal payments made by each buyer to diﬀer from the ﬁnal clearing
prices. In fact, this relaxation is already present in Ausubel’ auction [1], in addition to the
use of multiple price paths. In our characterization, the ﬁnal payments made by each buyer
can be determined either as a one-time discount from the ﬁnal clearing prices or dynamically
during the auction as in Ausubel’s earlier auctions [1, 2]. We believe that the use of a
single price path together with incremental discounting makes for transparent and simple
combinatorial auctions. In the presence of such discounting, prices in our auctions act as
means of eliciting preferences only and not as prices which are paid eventually by buyers.
Our main contribution is a broad class of ascending price auctions which achieve the VCG
outcome for general valuations using a single price path. For this, we introduce the concept
of universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices. UCE prices are competitive equilibrium
(CE) prices (possibly non-linear and non-anonymous) of the main economy as well as CE
prices of every“marginal economy”(an economy where a single buyer is excluded). We show
that UCE prices are necessary and suﬃcient to achieve the VCG outcome using an ascending
price auction. Our broad class of ascending price auctions search for UCE prices, with VCG
payments determined either as one-time discounts from the clearing prices or dynamically
during the auction. The overall discount to a buyer from the ﬁnal clearing price on his bundle
of items is his marginal contribution to the revenue of the seller at the ﬁnal auction prices.
Truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions.
Even though discounts are given, buyers still respond to auction prices, sans discount,
for bidding. Thus, the prices in our auctions act as means for eliciting preferences of buyers.
The actual payments of buyers are functions of the auction prices but not always the prices
they see. As pointed out by de Vries et al. [11], it is not possible to design an ascending
price auction achieving VCG outcome which maintains a single price path and in which
buyers pay what they see as prices. For exactly the same reason, the price path generated
by subtracting the discounts from our auction prices in each round is not ascending.
The general class of auctions is described as a“black-box model”in which prices are main-
tained in each round and buyers can report their demand set at current prices as bids. The
auctions increase prices in each round, maintaining quasi-CE prices for the main economy
and marginal economies and making progress towards UCE prices. We present two speciﬁc
auctions within this class. One of them generalizes the primal-dual auction in de Vries et
al. [11] and the other generalizes the iBundle auction in Parkes and Ungar [27] (known to
3implement a subgradient algorithm [11, 12]). The beauty of the latter auction is the simple
and transparent price adjustment step. But, auctions based on primal-dual algorithms are
believed to have faster convergence properties [11]. In both cases, we present the ﬁrst as-
cending (multi-item) Vickrey auction for general valuations with a single price path. Instead
of giving discounts to buyers at the end of our auctions, we can also dynamically calculate
their discounts during the auction.
For the special case of buyers-are-substitutes, known to be necessary and suﬃcient for
the existence of CE prices that simultaneously give VCG payoﬀs to each buyer [7], UCE
prices are achieved as soon as CE prices of the main economy are achieved and no additional
rounds of bidding are required to determine ﬁnal payments. In comparison, the auctions in
de Vries et al. [11] and Ausubel and Milgrom [3] need a stronger condition to achieve the
VCG outcome because they do not allow discounts upon termination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the concept of
UCE price and give its connection to the VCG mechanism. In Section 3, we deﬁne our broad
class of auctions. We give two speciﬁc auctions and analyze their theoretical properties in
Sections 4 and 5. We summarize and conclude in Section 6.
2 Universal Competitive Equilibrium
We deﬁne the combinatorial allocation problem and the concept of universal competitive
equilibrium (UCE) price. Later, we will illustrate how this UCE price concept can be used
to design ascending price auctions.
2.1 The Model
A seller has n heterogeneous indivisible items to sell. The set of items is denoted by A =
{1,...,n}. There are m (≥ 2) buyers, denoted by B = {1,...,m}. The set of all bundles
of items is denoted by Ω = {S ⊆ A}. Naturally, ∅ ∈ Ω. For every buyer i ∈ B and every
bundle S ∈ Ω, the valuation of i on bundle S is denoted by vi(S) ≥ 0, assumed to be a
non-negative integer. We impose the following restrictions on valuations of any buyer:
A1 Private Valuations: Each buyer knows his own valuation and it does not depend on
the valuations of other buyers.
A2 Quasi-linear Utility: The utility or payoﬀ of any buyer i ∈ B on a bundle S is given
by vi(S) − p, where p is the price paid by buyer i on bundle S. Also, if a buyer gets
nothing and pays nothing, then his utility is zero: vi(∅) := 0 ∀ i ∈ B.
A3 Free Disposal (Monotonicity): vi(S) ≤ vi(T) ∀ i ∈ B, ∀ S,T ∈ Ω with S ⊆ T.
A4 Zero Seller Valuations: The seller values the items at zero. His utility or payoﬀ or
revenue is the total payment he receives at a price.
4Assumptions A1-A4 are standard in literature. Unless stated explicitly, we do not pose any
restriction on the valuations of the buyers besides these four assumptions and call them the
general valuations.
Let B−i = B \{i} be the set of buyers without buyer i. Let B = {B,B−1,...,B−m}. We
will denote the economy with buyers only from set M ⊆ B as E(M). Whenever, M 6= B
and M ∈ B, we call economy E(M) a marginal economy. E(B) is called the main economy.
We now deﬁne the combinatorial allocation problem [30]. The combinatorial allocation
problem seeks to ﬁnd an eﬃcient allocation of the main economy. Let X denote a feasible
allocation in economy E(M) (M ∈ B). Allocation X is a vector of bundles on buyers in M
such that Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ for any i 6= j. Allocation X assigns bundle Xi to buyer i for every
i ∈ M. The possibility of Xi = ∅ is allowed. We will denote the set of all feasible allocations
of economy E(M) as X(M).
An allocation X is eﬃcient in economy E(M) if there does not exist another allocation
Y ∈ X(M) such that
P
i∈M vi(Yi) >
P
i∈M vi(Xi). From assumption A3, every eﬃcient
allocation X ∈ X(M) should have
S
i∈M Xi = A.
The problem of ﬁnding an eﬃcient allocation can be formulated as a linear program [7].
Let yi(S) ∈ {0,1} be a variable which is assigned value 1 if a buyer i ∈ B is allocated a
bundle S ∈ Ω (S = ∅ is allowed) and assigned zero otherwise. Let z(X) ∈ {0,1} be a variable
which is assigned 1 if allocation X ∈ X(M) is selected. The eﬃcient allocation problem of
economy E(M) (for any M ⊆ B) is as follows:
V (M) = max
y,z
X
i∈M
X
S∈Ω
vi(S)yi(S) (P(M))
s.t.
X
S∈Ω
yi(S) = 1 ∀ i ∈ M.
X
X∈X(M)
z(X) = 1.
yi(S) =
X
X:Xi=S
z(X) ∀ S ∈ Ω, ∀ i ∈ M.
yi(S) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ M, ∀ S ∈ Ω.
z(X) ≥ 0 ∀ X ∈ X(M).
Given this, the dual problem is deﬁned as:
V (M) = min
π,πs,pπ
s +
X
i∈M
πi (DP(M))
s.t.
π
s ≥
X
i∈M
pi(Xi) ∀ X ∈ X(M).
πi ≥ vi(S) − pi(S) ∀ i ∈ M, ∀ S ∈ Ω.
5Dual variables pi(S) can be interpreted as the price on bundle S to buyer i, with πi being
the maximum payoﬀ to buyer i across all bundles and πs being the maximum payoﬀ to the
seller across all allocations in X(M).
Deﬁne the demand set of buyer i at price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ as
Di(p) :=
￿
S ∈ Ω : vi(S) − pi(S) ≥ vi(T) − pi(T) ∀ T ∈ Ω
￿
and the supply set of the seller at price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ in economy E(M) as
L(p) :=
￿
X ∈ X(M) :
X
i∈M
pi(Xi) ≥
X
i∈M
pi(Yi) ∀ Y ∈ X(M)
￿
.
Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) Price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ (feasible solution of
(DP(M))) and allocation X (feasible solution of (P(M))) are a competitive equilibrium
(CE) of economy E(M) for some M ⊆ B if X ∈ L(p), and Xi ∈ Di(p) for every buyer i ∈ M.
Price p is called a CE price vector of economy E(M).
From standard duality theory we can understand why the allocation supported in CE
prices is eﬃcient.2 Given feasible solution (y,z) to (P(M)) and feasible solution (p,π,πs) to
(DP(M)), we have the following complementary slackness (CS) conditions:
yi(S)
h
πi − [vi(S) − pi(S)]
i
= 0 ∀ i ∈ M, ∀ S ∈ Ω. (CS-1)
z(X)
h
π
s −
X
i∈M
pi(Xi)
i
= 0 ∀ X ∈ X(M). (CS-2)
Solutions (y,z) and (π,πs,p) are optimal for the primal and dual problems respectively if
and only if these CS conditions hold. From this we recover the standard intuition for CE
prices: if yi(S) = 1 then S ∈ Di(p) from CS-1 (buyers receive a bundle in their demand set)
and if z(X) = 1 then X ∈ L(p) from CS-2 (the seller maximizes his revenue).
In the rest of the paper, every price vector p will be deﬁned on p ∈ R
|B|×|Ω|
+ (unless stated
otherwise) and the projection of p on R
|M|×|Ω|
+ will be denoted as pM (or, p−i if M = B−i).
A component of pM will still be denoted as pi(·) for every i ∈ M. For simplicity, we will
often denote πi(p) as the payoﬀ of buyer i and πs(pM) as the payoﬀ or revenue of the seller
in economy E(M) at prices p. If we are considering buyers from set M only, then the vector
of payoﬀs of buyers from M is simply denoted as πM(p) (or, simply π−i(p) if M = B−i).
Deﬁnition 2 (Universal Competitive Equilibrium Price) A price vector p is a uni-
versal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price vector if pM is a CE price vector of economy
E(M) for every M ∈ B.
We provide some examples to illustrate the idea of UCE prices in Section 2.3. For now,
we note that UCE prices do not require any similarity between the allocations that are
supported in the CE of each of the marginal economies. Also, UCE prices always exist since
p := v are (trivial) UCE prices.
2Bikhchandani and Ostroy [7] were the ﬁrst to observe that non-anonymous and non-linear CE prices
support the eﬃcient allocation in the combinatorial allocation problem.
62.2 Vickrey Payments and UCE Prices
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [31, 8, 15] is an ex post eﬃcient and ex post in-
dividually rational direct revelation mechanism for which truth revelation is a dominant strat-
egy (i.e., it is strategyproof, or truthful). Given submitted valuation proﬁles ˆ v = (ˆ v1,..., ˆ vm),
ˆ vi representing the submitted valuation function (a vector on bundles) of buyer i, the VCG
mechanism solves the eﬃcient allocation problem for the main economy and the marginal
economies. The implemented allocation X∗ is an eﬃcient allocation in the main economy
and the payment for buyer i is calculated as p
vcg
i = ˆ vi(X∗
i ) − [V (B) − V (B−i)]. We refer
to a buyer’s (equilibrium) payoﬀ in the VCG mechanism, which is his marginal product
V (B) − V (B−i) as the Vickrey payoﬀ and the payment as the Vickrey payment.
Consider the problem of determining Vickrey payments from a CE (p,X). We show that
it is necessary and suﬃcient that p is a UCE price vector.
Theorem 1 Let (p,X) be a CE of the main economy. The Vickrey payments of every
buyer can be calculated from (p,X) if and only if p is a UCE price vector. Moreover, if
p is a UCE price vector, then for every buyer i ∈ B, the Vickrey payment of buyer i is
p
vcg
i = pi(Xi) − [πs(p) − πs(p−i)].
Proof: Suﬃciency of UCE Prices: Consider a buyer i ∈ B. Let (p−i,Y ) be a CE of
economy E(B−i). From the deﬁnition of Vickrey payment, we have:
p
vcg
i = vi(Xi) − [V (B) − V (B−i)].
= vi(Xi) −
X
j∈B
"h
vj(Xj) − pj(Xj)
i
+ pj(Xj)
#
+
X
j∈B−i
"h
vj(Yj) − pj(Yj)
i
+ pj(Yj)
#
= pi(Xi) −
X
j∈B
pj(Xj) +
X
j∈B−i
pj(Yj)
−
X
j∈B−i
h
vj(Xj) − pj(Xj)
i
+
X
j∈B−i
h
vj(Yj) − pj(Yj)
i
(rearranging terms). (1)
Since (p,X) is a CE of the main economy we have Xj ∈ Dj(p) for every j ∈ B. Similarly,
(p−i,Y ) is a CE of economy E(B−i). So, Yj ∈ Dj(p) for every j ∈ B−i. This means
vj(Xj) − pj(Xj) = vj(Yj) − pj(Yj) for every j ∈ B−i. This cancels terms in Equation 1 and
transforms it as p
vcg
i = pi(Xi)−
hP
j∈B pj(Xj)−
P
j∈B−i pj(Yj)
i
= pi(Xi)−[πs(p)−πs(p−i)].
Necessity of UCE Prices: Construct the valuation proﬁle v0 as v0
i(S) := pi(S) for every
i ∈ B and every S ∈ Ω. p is a CE price vector of the main economy at valuation proﬁle v0.
The Vickrey payment of every buyer i ∈ B at valuation proﬁle v0 is v0
i(Xi)−V (B)+V (B−i) =
pi(Xi) − πs(p) + πs(p−i). Since the Vickrey payments are calculated only from (p,X), they
should be calculated in the same manner for all the valuation valuation proﬁles for which
(p,X) is a CE of the main economy. This means, for every buyer i ∈ B, the Vickrey payment
should be calculated as: pi(Xi) − πs(p) + πs(p−i).
7Assume for contradiction that p is a CE price vector for the main economy but not a
UCE price vector. This means, for some marginal economy E(B−j), p−j is not a CE price
vector. (p−j,π−j(p),πs(p−j)) constitute a dual feasible solution of formulation (DP(B−j))
but not an optimal solution since p−j is not a CE price vector of E(B−j). So, we can
write
P
i∈B−j πi(p) + πs(p−j) < V (B−j). Since (p,X) is a CE of the main economy, we
have
P
i∈B πi(p) + πs(p) = V (B). Substituting into the standard expression for the Vickrey
payment of buyer j, we have:
p
vcg
j = vj(Xj) − V (B) + V (B−j) < pj(Xj) − π
s(p) + π
s(p−j).
This gives us a contradiction. ￿
We refer to the term πs(p) − πs(p−i) as the discount for buyer i and the term pi(Xi) −
[πs(p) − πs(p−i)] as the discounted price for buyer i. Notice that the claims in Theorem 1
continue to hold for restricted classes of valuations and for simpler prices such as anonymous
or item prices. Also, notice that the adjustment reduces immediately to the standard VCG
payment deﬁnition for UCE prices p := v.
Before continuing to provide some examples of this correspondence between UCE prices
and Vickrey payments we deﬁne the following restricted class of valuations:
Deﬁnition 3 (Buyers are Substitutes) We say buyers are substitutes (BAS) if V (B)−
V (K) ≥
P
i∈B\K
h
V (B) − V (B−i)
i
∀ K ⊆ B.
Intuitively, BAS holds when buyers are more alike than diﬀerent and contribute decreasing
marginal product as the size of the economy grows. The gross substitutes condition, familiar
in economics, implies that BAS holds [5]. BAS is important in the current context because it
exactly characterizes the restriction on valuations required for each buyer to simultaneously
receive his Vickrey payoﬀ at some CE price vector [7].
2.3 Examples
We now give some examples to illustrate the concept of UCE prices and the discounted prices
which give Vickrey payments. Table 1 (a) illustrates a problem with two buyers and two
items and valuations. It is easy to verify that buyers are substitutes in this example. A
UCE price vector (p) in this example is p1(∅) = p2(∅) = 0, p1({1}) = p
vcg
1 = 6, p1({2}) = 8,
p1({1,2}) = p2({1,2}) = 10, p2({1}) = 2, p2({2}) = p
vcg
2 = 4. In the main economy, the
eﬃcient allocation (buyer 1 gets item 1 and buyer 2 gets item 2) is supported at p. In
the marginal economy with only buyer 1, eﬃcient allocation (buyer 1 gets both items) is
supported at p−2. Also, in the marginal economy with only buyer 2, eﬃcient allocation
(buyer 2 gets both items) is supported at p−1. Also, observe that Vickrey payments are
directly calculated (without discounts) at this UCE price vector.
Table 1 (b) provides an example with three buyers and two items. It is easy to verify
that buyers are not substitutes in this example. A UCE price vector (p) is the following:
8∅ {1} {2} {1,2}
1 0 8 9 12
2 0 6 8 14
(a) Buyers are substitutes.
∅ {1} {2} {1,2}
1 0 3 0 3
2 0 0 6 6
3 0 0 2 4
(b) Buyers are not substitutes.
Table 1: Examples to show the correspondence between UCE prices and Vickrey payments
p1(∅) = p2(∅) = p3(∅) = 0, p1({1}) = 2, p1({2}) = 0, p1({1,2}) = 2, p2({1}) = 0, p2({2}) =
4, p2({1,2}) = 4, p3({1}) = 0, p3({2}) = 2, p3({1,2}) = 4. In the main economy and in
the marginal economy with buyers 1 and 2 only, the eﬃcient allocation (buyer 1 gets item 1,
buyer 2 gets item 2 and buyer 3 gets nothing) is supported at p−3. In the marginal economy
with buyers 1 and 3 only, the eﬃcient allocation (buyer 1 gets item 1 and buyer 3 gets item
2) is also supported at p−2. Similarly, in the marginal economy with buyers 2 and 3 only,
the eﬃcient allocation (buyer 2 gets item 2 and buyer 3 gets item 1) is supported at p−1.
The Vickrey payments for buyers can be calculated as: p
vcg
1 = p1({1}) − [πs(p) − πs(p−1)] =
2 − [6 − 4] = 0, p
vcg
2 = p2({2}) − [πs(p) − πs(p−2)] = 4 − [6 − 4] = 2, p
vcg
3 = 0.
3 A Class of Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions
We provide a relaxation of the traditional deﬁnition of ascending price auctions to retain
a single price path but allow for ﬁnal payments to be determined as an adjustment from
(ﬁnal) clearing prices. We introduce a “black-box model” for the general class of ascending
price Vickrey auctions that fall within this deﬁnition, and provide ex post eﬃciency and
equilibrium claims for any auction in this class. This reverses a negative result in de Vries
et al. [11], which holds for a more restricted auction deﬁnition. In addition, we demonstrate
that auctions within our class must maintain both non-anonymous and non-linear prices to
achieve the VCG outcome, even in the special cases of gross substitutes valuations.
The speciﬁc auction protocols, namely a generalization of the primal-dual auction in
de Vries et al. [11] and the subgradient auction in Parkes and Ungar [27], are deﬁned in
subsequent sections. In Sections 3.1 to 3.3 we will assume that buyers submit true demand
sets in each round, i.e. bid truthfully. This bidding strategy is shown to be an ex post Nash
equilibrium in Section 3.4.
3.1 A Relaxed Deﬁnition of Ascending Price Auctions
In deﬁning a class of ascending price auctions we mainly follow de Vries et al. [11] and Gul
and Stacchetti [16]. The main diﬀerence is that we relax the requirement that the ﬁnal prices
in the auction deﬁne payments of buyers. First, we deﬁne the notion of a price path:
9Deﬁnition 4 A price path is any of these four types of functions:
• Linear and anonymous price path: P : T → R
|A|
+ ,
• Linear and non-anonymous price path: P : T → R
|A|×|B|
+ ,
• Non-linear and anonymous price path: P : T → R
|Ω|
+ ,
• Non-linear and non-anonymous price path: P : T → R
|Ω|×|B|
+ ,
where T denotes the set of rounds in an auction and t ∈ T denotes a round in an auction
with P(t) denoting a price vector seen at time t. A price path is ascending if P(t) is non-
decreasing with time.
Deﬁnition 5 (Ascending Price Auction) An ascending price auction is a single
ascending price path P(·) which starts from P(0) and ends at P(T) with an allocation and
payment for buyers such that:
C1 At every round t, buyers report their demand set (bids) at price vector P(t).
C2 For every round t ∈ T, the price adjustment is determined only by current price vector
P(t) and current demand set information: Di(P(t)) for every buyer i ∈ B.
C3 Every buyer i ∈ B gets a bundle (possibly ∅) from his demand set Di(P(T)) at the end
of the auction.
C4 The ﬁnal payment of buyers is determined from the ﬁnal allocation and price vector in
the last round (P(T)) only.
Many auctions in the literature fall into this class of ascending price auctions including the
single-path auctions in Ausubel [2] and de Vries et al. [11]. 3 4
One notable exception is Ausubel’s multi-item auction [1], which maintains multiple price
paths, each linear and anonymous, and performs clinching and unclinching of items in deter-
mining payments dynamically during the auction. This auction achieves the VCG outcome
for gross substitutes valuations. Similarly, the multi-path variation of the auction in de Vries
et al. [11] lies outside of this class.
The traditional deﬁnition of ascending price auctions, as formalized by de Vries et al. [11]
is the following. We call it ascending price(0) auctions to indicate that no adjustment to
ﬁnal prices is done in these auctions to calculate payments of buyers.
3The auction of Ausubel and Milgrom [3] can also be provided with a non-proxied, ascending-price
interpretation, at which point it is equivalent to the iBundle auction [24].
4Ausubel’s auction [2] for homogeneous items appears not to fall within this class because it performs
clinching of items during the auction with linear and anonymous prices. However, it can be reinterpreted
as an auction that maintains a single non-linear and non-anonymous price path and terminates with a CE
price vector that gives the Vickrey payments for non-increasing marginal valuations [6].
10Deﬁnition 6 (Ascending Price(0) Auctions) An ascending price(0) auction is an
ascending price auction with Step C4 modiﬁed as follows:
C4’ The ﬁnal payment of buyers is the ﬁnal price seen by them on their respective ﬁnal
allocation.
Clearly, every ascending price(0) auction is also an ascending price auction. Besides the
multi-path auctions discussed, all previously known auctions are ascending price(0) auctions.
For such auctions, de Vries et al. provide the following negative result.
Theorem 2 (de Vries et al. [11]) Suppose there are two items and at least three buyers.
If the valuation of one of the buyers fail the gross substitutes condition, then there exists a
class of valuations for other buyers satisfying the gross substitutes condition such that no
ascending price(0) auction can terminate with VCG prices for these valuations when buyers
bid truthfully.
The proof of this Theorem is done by constructing a parametric valuation proﬁle with
valuations of all but one buyer satisfying the gross substitutes condition and showing that the
VCG payments of buyers depend on the parameter but the ﬁnal prices of ascending price(0)
auctions do not. To overcome this negative result of Theorem 2, we propose ascending price
auctions by relaxing condition [C4’] in Deﬁnition 6 to [C4].
We consider ascending price auctions in which truthful submission of demand sets in
response to prices in each round is an ex post Nash equilibrium in the sense of Jehiel et
al. [17].
Deﬁnition 7 Truthful bidding in every round of an auction is an ex post Nash equilib-
rium if for every buyer i ∈ B, if buyers in B−i follow the truthful bidding strategy, then
buyer i maximizes his payoﬀ in the auction by following the truthful bidding strategy.
A strategy proﬁle that is an ex post Nash equilibrium is invariant to the private valuation
of each buyer. This makes it appropriate for auctions in which buyers have incomplete
information about valuations of others.5 6
As we will elaborate later, prices in our auctions act as means for eliciting preferences and
not as prices paid by buyers in the end. Our auctions will involve discounts for buyers at the
end (or, discounts calculated incrementally across rounds). Truthful bidding does not take
into account such discounts while calculating bids (demand sets). Truthful bidding involves,
for every buyer, calculation of demand sets with respect to true valuation and current auction
prices (without any discounts).
5An ex post Nash equilibrium is also a Bayesian Nash equilibrium because a buyer maximizes his payoﬀ
in an ex post Nash equilibrium for any belief about the valuations of other buyers, but more robust [17].
6Ex post Nash equilibrium has been adopted as a solution concept in other ascending price auction models,
for instance in [11]. Ex post implementation has also been adopted for direct-revelation mechanisms with
interdependent values, see for instance [21] .
11More speciﬁcally, we are concerned with eﬃcient ascending price auctions, i.e., auc-
tions in which truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium strategy and in which the
auction terminates with an eﬃcient allocation.
Proposition 1 If X is the ﬁnal allocation and p is the ﬁnal price vector in an eﬃcient
ascending price auction, then (p,X) is a CE of the main economy. 7
Proof: First, X is an eﬃcient allocation of the main economy by the deﬁnition of eﬃcient
ascending price auction. Any ascending price auction selects a ﬁnal allocation from the price
and demand set information in the ﬁnal round. Thus, if X is an eﬃcient allocation, then
it is an eﬃcient allocation for all valuations consistent with demand set proﬁle D(p) :=
(D1(p),...,Dn(p)).
By property (C3) of an ascending price auction, Xi ∈ Di(p) for all i ∈ B. Assume for
contradiction X / ∈ L(p). Now, consider the valuation proﬁle v￿ as follows. If ∅ / ∈ Di(p), then
v
￿
i(S) =
￿
pi(S) + ￿ ∀ S ∈ Di(p)
pi(S) otherwise
for some small ￿ > 0. If ∅ ∈ Di(p), then
v
￿
i(S) =
￿
pi(S) ∀ S ∈ Di(p)
pi(S) − ￿ otherwise
Clearly, v￿ is consistent with D(p). Consider an allocation ˆ X ∈ L(p). There can be a
maximum of min(m,n) non-empty bundles in ˆ X. Since ˆ X ∈ L(p), we can ﬁnd small enough
￿ > 0 (￿ <
￿
i∈B[pi( ˆ Xi)−pi(Xi)]
min(m,n) ) such that
P
i∈B v￿
i( ˆ Xi) >
P
i∈B v￿
i(Xi). This means, X is not
an eﬃcient allocation for valuation proﬁle v￿ for some small enough ￿ > 0. This gives us a
contradiction. So, X ∈ L(p) and Xi ∈ Di(p) for every i ∈ B. Thus, (p,X) is a CE of the
main economy. ￿
Using Proposition 1, we prove a stronger result for eﬃcient ascending price auctions.
Proposition 2 An eﬃcient ascending price auction in which all buyers that are allocated
no items have zero payment must terminate with a UCE price vector.
Proof: From Proposition 1, an eﬃcient ascending price auction must terminate at CE price
vector of the main economy. From the revelation principle, the direct revelation mechanism
of an eﬃcient ascending price auction has an equilibrium in which truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy. But Groves mechanisms are the only strategy-proof and eﬃcient direct
7Results similar to Proposition 1 can be found in Nisan and Segal [22] and Parkes [25]. Nisan and Segal’s
result, applicable for a more general setting than combinatorial auctions, states that if we can determine an
eﬃcient allocation from a set of“messages”(demand sets and prices in our case), then we can also construct
a CE price from these messages. These earlier results do not appear to imply our result because they do not
require that the prices in the message are already CE prices.
12mechanisms [14]. Moreover, the VCG mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in which
every loser pays nothing. This means, the ﬁnal payment in an eﬃcient ascending price
auction in which every loser pays nothing is the Vickrey payment. From property (C4) of
ascending price auctions, the ﬁnal payments are determined from the ﬁnal CE price vector
and eﬃcient allocation. From Theorem 1, this price vector must be a UCE price vector. ￿
3.2 Insuﬃciency of Simpler Prices
Many known combinatorial auctions [24, 11, e.g.] maintain non-linear and non-anonymous
prices. This requires maintaining an exponential number of prices in the auction in the worst
case, although in practice one only needs to report explicit prices on bundles that receive
bids.
We brieﬂy consider whether one can maintain simpler prices and still achieve the VCG
outcome in the auctions within our class. Since the deﬁnition of ascending price auctions
requires termination with CE prices (Proposition 1) we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 ([7]) Every eﬃcient ascending price auction must allow a non-linear and
non-anonymous price path.
We are interested to understand whether simpler price paths are suﬃcient for special cases,
such as that of gross substitutes preferences. This is a broad class of preferences for which
a linear and anonymous CE price vector exists [18], and thus interesting to consider.
Deﬁnition 8 (Gross Substitutes) A valuation function vi satisﬁes gross substitutes
(GS) if, for all price vectors p,p0 ∈ R
|Ω|×|B|
+ such that pi(S) =
P
j∈S pi({j}) ≤ p0
i(S) = P
j∈S p0
i({j}), ∀ i ∈ B, ∀ S ∈ Ω and for all S ∈ Di(p), there exists S0 ∈ Di(p0) such that
{j ∈ S : pi({j}) = p0
i({j})} ⊆ S0.
Informally, valuations satisfy gross substitutes (or simply substitutes) if a buyer continues to
demand the same item when the price on another item increases.
Gul and Stacchetti [16] already established that a traditional ascending price auction
with a linear and anonymous price path cannot terminate with VCG prices for substitutes
valuations. On the other hand, Ausubel [1] showed that multiple anonymous and linear price
paths are suﬃcient by cleverly using information collected from buyers in these price paths.
Considering anonymous but possibily non-linear prices, we can ﬁrst observe that anony-
mous UCE prices only exist when BAS. To see this, notice that the discount is zero when
prices are anonymous (by the deﬁnition of the price adjustment in Theorem 1), and thus
prices must already support VCG payments if they are UCE. Yet, this equivalence between
UCE and VCG payments (and thus between CE and VCG) requires BAS. So, non-anonymous
prices will be required in most interesting cases.
We also have the following negative result, which shows that both non-linear and non-
anonymous prices are required even for the restricted case of substitutes valuations.
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tain a non-linear and non-anonymous price path for substitutes valuations.
Proof: We will show that for the example in Table 1 (a), the the UCE price vectors are
non-linear and non-anonymous. From Proposition 2, the result then follows.
Assume for contradiction that p ∈ R
|B|×|A|
+ is a UCE price vector for the example. It is
easy to see that in the CE of E(B), buyer 1 is assigned item 1 and in the CE of E(B−2),
buyer 1 is assigned bundle {1,2}. This means, 8 − p1({1}) = 12 − [p1({1}) + p1({2})].
This gives us p1({2}) = 4. Similarly, buyer 2 is assigned item 2 in CE of E(B) and bundle
{1,2} in CE of E(B−1). This means, 8 − p2({2}) = 14 − [p2({1}) + p2({2})]. This gives us,
p2({1}) = 6. Now, since buyer 1 is assigned item 1 in CE of E(B), we have 8 − p1({1}) ≥
9 − p1({2}) = 5. This gives us, p1({1}) ≤ 3. Also, the seller should maximize his utility
in the CE allocation of E(B). This means, p1({1}) + p2({2}) ≥ p2({1}) + p2({2}). This
gives us, p1({1}) ≥ p2({1}) = 6. Putting these together, we have a contradiction. A similar
argument shows that there does not exist p ∈ R
|Ω|
+ , which is a UCE price vector in example
in Table 1. A non-linear and non-anonymous UCE price vector is the “value=price” UCE
price vector. ￿
There are examples of auctions with anonymous and linear price paths, but only for
very restricted valuations. For instance, in the unit-demand case there exists anonymous
linear CE prices which give every buyer his Vickrey payoﬀ [19], and Demange et al. [13] have
designed an auction which ends with such CE prices.
3.3 A General Class of Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions
Continuing, we now deﬁne a black-box model for the general class of ascending price auctions
to which our main results apply. The auctions maintain non-anonymous and non-linear prices
and adjust prices until a UCE price vector is established.
As before, let πi(p) := maxS∈Ω[vi(S)−pi(S)] denote the maximum payoﬀ of a buyer i at
price vector p, with Di(p) denoting his demand set. Also, let πs(pM) := maxX∈X(M)
P
i∈M pi(Xi)
denote the maximum revenue to the seller in economy E(M) for every M ∈ B and L(pM)
denoting the supply set of the seller. Notation M+(p) := {i ∈ M : ∅ / ∈ Di(p)} denotes
buyers in economy E(M) who do not have ∅ in their demand set. We deﬁne
L
∗(pM) := {X ∈ L(pM) : Xi ∈ Di(p) ∪ {∅} ∀ i ∈ M} ⊆ L(pM) ∀ M ⊆ B (2)
to denote the subset of the revenue maximizing allocations (if any) of the seller that assigns
to every buyer either a bundle from his demand set or the ∅ bundle.
Deﬁnition 9 (Quasi-CE Price) Price vector p ∈ R
|M|×|Ω|
+ is a quasi-CE (QCE) price
vector of economy E(M) for some M ∈ B, if L∗(p) is non-empty. Price vector p ∈ R
|B|×|Ω|
+
is a universal QCE (uQCE) price vector if pM is a QCE price vector of economy E(M)
for every M ∈ B.
14Intuitively, prices are QCE if demand is no less than supply and prices are universal QCE
if demand is no less than supply in any marginal economy.
Using the notion of a uQCE price vector, we deﬁne a class of uQCE-invariant auctions
and show that any auction in this class maintains a uQCE price vector.
Deﬁnition 10 (uQCE-invariant Auctions) A uQCE-invariant auction is deﬁned as
follows:
S0 The auction starts at the zero price vector.
S1 In round t of the auction, with price vector pt:
S1.1 Collect demand sets of buyers at price vector pt.
S1.2 If pt is a UCE price vector with respect to reported demand sets, then go to Step
S2.
S1.3 Else, select a set of adjusted buyers ∅ 6= Ut ⊆ B+(pt) 8 who will see a price
increase.
S1.4 If i ∈ Ut and S ∈ Di(pt), then p
t+1
i (S) := pt
i(S) + 1. Else, p
t+1
i (S) := pt
i(S).
Repeat from Step S1.1.
S2 The auction ends with ﬁnal allocation of the auction being any X ∈ L∗(pT) and ﬁnal
payment of every buyer i ∈ B being pT
i (Xi)−
h
πs(pT)−πs(pT
−i)
i
, where pT is the ﬁnal
price vector of the auction.
The uQCE-invariant auctions clearly fall within the class of auctions introduced in Deﬁ-
nition 5. A single price vector is maintained in each round, and buyers respond with demand
sets. Notice that prices are only increased to buyers, Ut, that still report a non-empty de-
mand set (Step S1.3), and that prices on all bundles in such a buyer’s current demand set
are increased by unity (Step S1.4). The price adjustment suggested in Theorem 1 is adopted
on termination (Step S2).
The price adjustment process (selection of Ut in Step S1.3) deﬁnes a class of uQCE-
invariant auctions. Besides ∅ 6= Ut ⊆ B+(pt), we place no restriction on the choice of Ut.
For various selections of adjusted buyers, we will get diﬀerent auctions. All will be valid
ascending price Vickrey auctions. However, the speciﬁcs will aﬀect both the simplicity and
transparency of the auction as well as the speed of termination (see Section 3.5).
The auctions in this class may be called clock auctions because they maintain an ask
price and require that buyers state demand sets in each round. Buyers do not submit bid
prices. The traditional role of winner determination is still present, even if implicitly, and
even though feedback to buyers can be limited to ask prices and need not include information
about a provisional allocation. Winner determination is a natural way to test for UCE prices
8B+(pt), like M+(pt), is deﬁned as the set of all buyers in B who do not demand the ∅ bundle.
15and thus termination (Step S1.2) and also to determine the set of adjusted buyers that will
be used to deﬁne price updates (Step S1.3).
Here are two simple restrictions on the uQCE-invariant auctions:
• A uQCE-invariant(0) auction is a uQCE-invariant auction with Step S2 modiﬁed
as follows:
S2(0) The auction ends with the ﬁnal allocation of the auction being any X ∈ L∗(p) and
ﬁnal payment of every buyer i ∈ B being pi(Xi), where p is the ﬁnal price vector
of the auction.
• A uQCE-invariant auction for the main economy is a uQCE-invariant auction
with Step S1.2 modiﬁed as:
S1.2m If pt is a CE price vector of the main economy, then go to Step S2.
• A uQCE-invariant(0) auction for the main economy is a uQCE-invariant auc-
tion for the main economy with Step S2 modiﬁed as Step S2(0).
Most auctions in the literature are uQCE-invariant(0) auctions for the main economy.
Examples include auctions in de Vries et al. [11], Ausubel and Milgrom [3], Parkes [24]9,
and Bikhchandani and Ostroy [6]. These uQCE-invariant(0) auctions for the main econ-
omy can be easily converted to uQCE-invariant auctions for the main economy, and thus
ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. We extend two such auctions to
uQCE-invariant auctions in Sections 4 and 5.
If a uQCE-invariant auction is not a uQCE-invariant(0) auction, then the prices in such
an auction act as a means to elicit preferences of buyers. Payments of buyers are calculated
as a function of auction prices but need not equal the auction prices. Importantly, buyers
need to respond to auction prices, without considering discounts, for bidding. As we will
show, doing so truthfully will constitute an ex post Nash equilibrium for buyers in every
uQCE-invariant auction.
Our ﬁrst result is a theorem showing that every uQCE-invariant auction maintains uQCE
prices in every round and terminates with UCE prices.
Theorem 3 Every uQCE-invariant auction achieves the VCG outcome if all buyers submit
their true demand sets in each round.
Proof: Let pt be the price vector in round t of a uQCE-invariant auction.
Lemma 1 In any round t of a uQCE-invariant auction for every buyer i ∈ B the demand-
set weakly increases with Di(pt) ⊆ Di(pt+1).
9Although iBundle [24] also reports the provisional allocation in each round, this is not necessary for the
functioning of the auction.
16Proof: From the price adjustment and the starting price vector, the price vector in a uQCE-
invariant auction is an integer vector. In any round the auction, for every buyer i ∈ Ut, the
prices of bundles demanded by i are increased by unity. Since valuations of buyers are
assumed to be integers, the change in payoﬀ of i from such a price adjustment is -1. Since
price of any buyer not in Ut is unchanged, their payoﬀ is also unchanged. This implies that
demand set of every buyer weakly increases after a price adjustment, i.e., Di(pt) ⊆ Di(pt+1)
for any non-terminal round t in the auction. ￿
From Lemma 1, if S / ∈ Di(pt), then S was never demanded by i in any round before t.
From the starting price and price adjustment rule of the auction, this further implies that
if S / ∈ Di(pt), then pt
i(S) = 0. Now, consider economy E(M) for any M ∈ B. Clearly,
L(pt
M) is non-empty. Consider X ∈ L(pt
M). Construct allocation Y ∈ X(M) as Yi = Xi if
Xi ∈ Di(pt) and Yi = ∅ otherwise. As argued before, for any i ∈ M, if Xi / ∈ Di(pt), then
pt
i(Xi) = 0 = pt
i(∅) = pt
i(Yi). This means,
P
i∈M pt
i(Xi) =
P
i∈M pt
i(Yi). This further means
that Y ∈ L(pt
M). By the deﬁnition of Y , Y ∈ L∗(pt
M) indicating non-emptiness of L∗(pt
M).
This means, the price vector in every round of a uQCE-invariant auction is a uQCE price
vector.
For the second claim, observe that in any round t of a uQCE-invariant auction Ut ⊆
B+(pt). This means, if i / ∈ B+(pt), then the price of buyer i will not increase in any round t
of a uQCE-invariant auction. Due to unit price increase, the valuations of a buyer provides
an upper bound on the price in a uQCE-invariant auction. Since valuations of buyers are
ﬁnite, every uQCE-invariant auction will terminate ﬁnitely. By the termination condition
in Step S1.2 of Deﬁnition 10, the ﬁnal price vector is a UCE price vector and the ﬁnal
allocation is an eﬃcient allocation of the main economy. From the payment rule in Step S2
and Theorem 1, every uQCE-invariant auction achieves a VCG outcome. ￿
Using arguments similar to Lemma 1, it is also simple to show that the prices in every
round of uQCE-invariant auctions for the main economy and uQCE-invariant(0) auctions
for the main economy are uQCE prices. Given this, we can also consider the special case of
uQCE-invariant auctions for the main economy.
Theorem 4 If buyers are substitutes, then every uQCE-invariant auction for the main econ-
omy achieves the VCG outcome if buyers submit true demand sets in each round.
Proof: On termination of a uQCE-invariant auction for the main economy we have a uQCE
price vector that is also a CE price vector in the main economy. We show that such a price
vector is a UCE price vector when BAS holds. The result follows from Theorem 1.
Let p be a uQCE price vector. Consider a buyer i ∈ B. Since p−i is a QCE price vector
in economy E(B−i), consider X ∈ L∗(p−i) and let K = {k ∈ B−i : Xk 6= ∅}. Now,
π
s(p−i) =
X
k∈K
pk(Xk) =
X
k∈K
h
vk(Xk) − πk(p)
i
≤ V (K) −
X
k∈K
πk(p). (3)
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πi(p) + π
s(p) − π
s(p−i)
≥ πi(p) + π
s(p) − V (K) +
X
k∈K
πk(p) (From Equation 3)
= πi(p) + V (B) −
X
k∈B
πk(p) − V (K) +
X
k∈K
πk(p) (Since p is a CE)
= V (B) − V (K) −
X
k∈B\(K∪{i})
πk(p)
≥
X
k∈B\K
π
vcg
k −
X
k∈B\(K∪{i})
πk(p) (Since buyers are substitutes)
≥
X
k∈B\K
π
vcg
k −
X
k∈B\(K∪{i})
π
vcg
k = π
vcg
i
The last inequality comes from a result in Bikhchandani and Ostroy [7] which states that
under BAS the core payoﬀ (payoﬀ of buyers from a CE price vector) vectors form a lattice
and the unique maximum core payoﬀ is the Vickrey payoﬀ vector. But, πi(p) + πs(p) −
πs(p−i) =
P
k∈B πk(p) −
P
k∈B−i πk(p) + πs(p) − πs(p−i) ≤ V (B) − V (B−i) = π
vcg
i , where
the inequality comes from the fact that (p−i,π−i(p),πs(p−i)) is a dual feasible solution of
formulation (DP(B−i)). This means, for BAS, that π
vcg
i = πi +πs(p)−πs(p−i). This is true
for every buyer i ∈ B. From Theorem 1, p is a UCE price vector. ￿
As noted earlier, the auctions in Ausubel and Milgrom [3] and de Vries et al. [11] are
uQCE-invariant(0) auctions of the main economy. These auctions can be converted to a
uQCE-invariant auction for the main economy (by modifying Step S2(0) to Step S2), and
Theorem 4 shows that they terminate with VCG outcome under the BAS condition.
3.4 Incentives
Although the VCG mechanism is strategyproof and supports truthful bidding in a dominant
strategy equilibrium, an ascending price auction that achieves the VCG outcome will not
in general support truthful bidding in a dominant strategy equilibrium [16, 28, 3, 6, 11].
Instead, and with additional consistency requirements, then truthful bidding can be made
an ex post Nash equilibrium for a uQCE-invariant auction.
Deﬁnition 11 In an ascending price auction, the bidding strategy of buyer i is consistent
if there is some general valuation proﬁle v0 for which the reported demand set Di(pt) in each
round t satisﬁes
Di(p
t) = {S ∈ Ω : v
0
i(S) − p
t(S) ≥ v
0
i(T) − pi(T),∀ T ∈ Ω}. (4)
In words, there is a valuation proﬁle that explains the bidding strategy of a buyer as a
truthful bidding strategy across all rounds of the auction.
18Consistency can be achieved in a uQCE-invariant auction through appropriate activity
rules (e.g., see [4]) Denote the demand set submitted (possibly untruthfully) by buyer i in
round t as Di(pt) and consider the following activity rules (to be imposed in every round t):
• Round Monotonicity (RM): For every buyer i ∈ B, Di(pt) ⊆ Di(pt+1).
• Bundle Monotonicity (BM): For every buyer i ∈ B, if S ⊆ T and S ∈ Di(pt), then
T ∈ Di(pt).
Under truthful bidding, round monotonicity is satisﬁed by Theorem 3. Bundle monotonicity
is satisﬁed under truthful bidding in the ﬁrst round by free disposal and in subsequent rounds
by round monotonicity. We provide the proof of the suﬃciency of the activity rules in the
Appendix.10
Proposition 5 Under activity rules RM and BM, every bidding strategy of buyers is con-
sistent in uQCE-invariant auctions.
If we assume such consistency, then we have the following result. The proof resembles similar
proofs in [16, 6, 11] and is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 5 In a uQCE-invariant auction with activity rules that ensure consistency, truth-
ful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
This equilibrium does not require that the auction terminates with UCE prices for every
valuation proﬁle, as long as the auction terminates with CE prices of the main economy for
any deviation from truthful bidding. This is useful for auctions that terminate with UCE
prices for restricted valuations, but for which a deviation from truthful bidding may lead to
termination with CE prices but not UCE prices, e.g., auctions in [3, 11].
This gives us a corollary for a uQCE-invariant auction for the main economy which
achieves the VCG outcome only in restricted valuation domains. A suﬃcient condition for
the existence of such an auction is the BAS condition (Theorem 4).
Corollary 1 If buyers are substitutes, then every uQCE-invariant auction for the main
economy with activity rules that ensure consistency has truthful bidding as an ex post Nash
equilibrium.
3.5 Discussion
In adopting diﬀerent deﬁnitions for“adjusted buyers”we can deﬁne diﬀerent uQCE-invariant
auctions. In fact, one can select an arbitrary set of buyers Ut ⊆ B+(pt) (i.e., who do not have
∅ in their demand sets and are still actively bidding) as the adjusted buyers. Such an auction
will still maintain uQCE prices and terminate with the VCG outcome. This illustrates the
power of our construction.
10There are other interesting ways to ensure such consistency in bidding (see for instance [28, 3]).
19However, there is a drawback to selecting some arbitrary set with which to deﬁne price
adjustments. On one hand, we prefer not to select the largest possible set of adjusted buyers
in each round. The largest possible set is to simply increase prices on all buyers in B+(pt).
But, in this case we can unnecessarily increase the prices to some buyers. We prefer to avoid
this because as prices approach the ‘value=price’ UCE price vector, our auctions elicit all the
valuation information from buyer, and thus the auction loses this advantage over a sealed-bid
auction. In addition, we prefer to keep the discounts as low as possible (and zero whenever
possible) to improve the auction’s transparency and simplicity. However, we prefer not to
select the minimal set of adjusted buyers in each round. Such a set could be a single buyer
in B+(pt). Adjusting the price of one buyer at a time may lead to very slow progress of the
auction particularly when additional necessary price adjustments are already known.
So, we prefer to strike a balance and adjust the prices on a set of buyers such that:
(i) we maintain transparency and avoid unecessary demand revelation by making only
those price adjustments that are necessary to make progress towards UCE prices, and
(ii) we make quick enough progress in the auction by making multiple price adjustments
in each round when there is evidence that prices to multiple buyers must be increased to
make progress towards UCE prices.
In the rest of the paper, we will discuss two approaches to identify adjusted buyers in
every round of a uQCE-invariant auction. These two approaches deﬁne two types of uQCE-
invariant auctions which we relate to existing auctions in the literature. Besides adopting
the economic properties outlined in this section, the speciﬁc auctions that we identify also
have appeal to optimization algorithms (discussed in detail in [11]), and thus have a nice
algorithmic justiﬁcation.
4 Adjusted Buyers via a Primal-Dual Algorithm
In ﬁnding our ﬁrst class of adjusted buyers, we adopt the primal-dual linear programming
framework [5, 6, 11, 12]. We depart from previous work in one signiﬁcant way. All the
previous work considered primal-dual algorithms on the main economy and designed uQCE-
invariant(0) auctions for the main economy. In contrast, we consider the main economy and
every marginal economy simultaneously and formulate a primal problem to search for UCE
prices. From this, we can ﬁnd a class of adjusted buyers and thus a uQCE-invariant auction.
To summarize the methodology:
• For every M ∈ B, for economy E(M), formulate the eﬃcient allocation problem as a
linear program and construct a restricted primal problem.
• Construct a single restricted primal problem by combining constraints from restricted
primal problems for economy E(M) for every M ∈ B.
20• An optimal solution to the dual of this restricted primal gives us a set of adjusted
buyers.
This yields a design for a uQCE-invariant auction that searches for an optimal primal
and dual solution in economy E(M) for every M ∈ B and thus ﬁnds a UCE price vector.11
We call this auction the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction.
In deﬁning the auction, we choose to omit the technical details of its interpretation as
a primal-dual algorithm. The process of showing that such a price adjustment is a primal-
dual algorithm resembles the interpretations in earlier works [11, 6], and so we will defer
these details to the Appendix. Instead, we will simply deﬁne the method used to deﬁne
the adjusted buyers, which pins down the price-adjustment method and thus the particular
auction instance in the class.
4.1 The Primal-Dual uQCE-Invariant Auction
To deﬁne our ﬁrst auction, we ﬁrst introduce some additional concepts. In general, an
ascending price auction starts from a low price vector, where there is excess demand. The
price vector in the auction is adjusted till there is no excess demand. In a uQCE-invariant
auction, we adjust the price vector till there is no excess demand in the main and every
marginal economy. Thus, uQCE prices are maintained in every round of the auction and
the auction terminates with UCE prices. This idea of “universal” excess demand is used to
deﬁne our adjusted buyers.
In general, our auction maintains a price vector p ∈ R
|B|×|Ω|
+ . Consider an economy E(M)
for some M ∈ B. For any X ∈ L∗(pM) at price vector p, we say a buyer i is unsatisﬁed
in economy E(M) if Xi / ∈ Di(p). Denote the total set of unsatisﬁed buyers in a set of
buyers K ⊆ M+(p) at price vector p in allocation X ∈ L∗(pM) as ρ(X,K,pM). Find an
allocation in X∗ ∈ L∗(pM) at price vector p such that |ρ(X∗,K,pM)| ≤ |ρ(X,K,pM)| for
every X ∈ L∗(pM). For simplicity, denote such a group of buyers as ρ(K,pM).
Deﬁnition 12 (Universally Undersupplied Buyers) 12 A set of buyers K ⊆ M+(p)
are undersupplied in economy E(M) for some M ∈ B at price vector p if |ρ(K,pM)| > 0
and pM is a QCE price vector of economy E(M).
A set of buyers K ⊆ B+(p) are universally undersupplied at price vector p if buyers
in K ∩ M+(p) are undersupplied in economy E(M) for some M ∈ B at price vector p and
p is a u-QCE price vector.
11To reiterate, the auction is not searching for a solution to all m+1 economies using m+1 separate primal-
dual algorithms. Rather, the auction is a single primal-dual algorithm, that solves the eﬃcient allocation
problem of economy E(M) for every M ∈ B simultaneously. Each buyer faces a single ascending price path.
12The idea of undersupplied buyers was introduced in de Vries et al. [11] and we generalize it to deﬁne
universally undersupplied buyers.
21A set of buyers K ⊆ B+(p) are minimally universally undersupplied at price vector
p if there is no smaller K0 ( K such that buyers in K0 are also universally undersupplied at
price vector p and p is a u-QCE price vector.
If a set of buyers K are universally undersupplied at price vector p, then by deﬁnition p is
a uQCE price vector but not a UCE price vector. Thus, the buyers in K cannot be satisﬁed
simultaneously in any solution to winner determination in at least one economy E(M), for
some M ∈ B.
Deﬁnition 13 (Price Adjustment Rule I) The adjusted buyers for the primal-dual
uQCE-invariant auction in round t is a set of minimally universally undersupplied buy-
ers at price vector pt.
One way to determine this adjusted buyers is to solve the traditional problem of winner
determination in the following modiﬁed way:
(i) Solutions to winner determination are considered for economy E(M), for every M ∈ B.
(ii) For every M ∈ B and for every K ⊆ B+(p) at price p in the auction, solutions to
the winner determination problem of economy E(M) is picked to minimize the number of
unsatisﬁed buyers in the set of buyers K.
From Theorems 3 and 5, we immediately give the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction achieves the VCG outcome for gen-
eral valuations and truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
The primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction generalizes the primal-dual auction in de Vries
et al. [11]. The adjusted buyers in round t in the auction in de Vries et al. are a set of buyers
which are minimally undersupplied in the main economy at price vector pt. In our auction,
we look for minimally universally undersupplied buyers for price adjustment.
Observe that if K ⊆ B+(p) is a set of minimally universally undersupplied buyers at
price vector p, then K is minimally undersupplied in economy E(M) for some M ∈ B at
price vector p. The approach of considering all economies simultaneously, using universally
undersupplied buyers, is appealing because it gives us a natural way to select an economy
E(M) from which a set of minimally undersupplied buyers are chosen. Besides, it has a
primal-dual algorithm interpretation that considers the main economy and every marginal
economy simultaneously (see Appendix).
One can also adopt a sequential approach, which generalizes the primal-dual auction in
de Vries et al. [11]. For this, at any round of the auction, we just pick some economy E(M)
for which a CE is not achieved yet and run one round of this earlier auction design on that
marginal economy from the current prices. As noted above, de Vries et al. [11] ﬁnd a set of
minimally undersupplied buyers in order to adjust prices. In particular, in this sequential
approach we can order the elements in B in some order and run this earlier auction for every
element with each new stage starting from the closing prices of the last. If the main economy,
E(B), is the ﬁrst element chosen, then in the ﬁrst stage we run the exact auction in de Vries
et al. [11].
224.2 A Clinching Interpretation
We will provide an alternative method to calculate the ﬁnal discount in the primal-dual
uQCE-invariant auction. This method determines the ﬁnal discount dynamically during
the auction and thus improves the transparency of the auction. This interpretation of the
auction highlights some similarities with the earlier clinching and credit/debit auctions of
Ausubel [2, 1].
For this, we will ﬁrst deﬁne some concepts. At any round t of the auction, let Kt be the
minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers. We will say a buyer i ∈ Kt is satisﬁed
in economy E(M) in round t if i / ∈ ρ(Kt,pt
M). Deﬁne Q(pt
M) := Kt \ ρ(Kt,pt
M). Informally,
Q(pt
M) is the set of all buyers who are satisﬁed and belong to Kt (i.e., see a price increase)
in economy E(M) in round t. For simplicity, we will write the set of satisﬁed buyers in the
main economy in round t who see a price increase as Q(pt). Now, we can track the revenue
of the seller across rounds.
Proposition 6 The change in revenue of the seller in economy E(M) in a round t of the
primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction is |Q(pt
M)| for every M ∈ B.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: Consider economy E(M) for any M ∈ B and let Kt be a minimally universally
undersupplied set of buyers in round t. So, we can satisfy any proper subset of buyers of Kt∩
M+(pt) simultaneously, i.e., for every K0 ( Kt, ρ(K0,pt
M) = ∅. Consider T ( (Kt∩M+(pt))
such that T = (Kt ∩ M+(pt)) \ {i}. Since Kt is minimally universally undersupplied, there
exists some allocation X ∈ L∗(pt
M) such that for every j ∈ T, Xj ∈ Dj(pt). By considering
X again for simultaneously satisfying buyers in Kt, we get ρ(Kt,pt
M) ≤ 1 (the only potential
buyer who cannot be satisﬁed is i). This means, |Q(pt
M)| ≥ |Kt ∩ M+(pt)| − 1. From
the deﬁnition of Q(pt
M), we have Q(pt
M) ⊆ Kt ∩ M+(pt). This gives us |Kt ∩ M+(pt)| ≥
|Q(pt
M)| ≥ |Kt ∩ M+(pt)| − 1.
Step 2: Again, consider economy E(M) for any M ∈ B and let Kt be a minimally
universally undersupplied set of buyers in round t. Let X∗ ∈ L∗(pt
M) be an allocation
such that ρ(Kt,pt
M) = ρ(X∗,Kt,pt
M). Since Q(pt
M) denotes the set of satisﬁed buyers from
Kt ∩ M+(pt) in economy E(M), the revenue of the seller from X∗ is increased by |Q(pt
M)|
due to price increase. Now, consider any other feasible allocation X 6= X∗ of economy
E(M). If X / ∈ L(pt
M), then the revenue from X can increase by a maximum |Kt ∩ M+(pt)|.
If X ∈ L(p
t+1
M ), then the change in revenue of the seller in economy E(M) becomes ≤
|Kt ∩ M+(pt)| − 1 ≤ |Q(pt
M)| (using the result in Step 1). If X ∈ L(pt
M), the maximum
number of buyers that can be satisﬁed in K ∩M+(pt) is |Q(pt
M)| (using the result in Step 1).
This means, the revenue from allocation X can increase by a maximum of |Q(pt
M)|. These
arguments imply that the change in revenue of the seller is |Q(pt
M)| in economy E(M). ￿
Proposition 6 shows that by identifying the adjusted buyers we can also determine the
change in revenue of economy E(M) for every M ∈ B in a round of the primal-dual uQCE-
23invariant auction. 13 This fact enables us to improve the transparency and simplicity of our
auction by allowing us to calculate the discounts of the buyers dynamically.
In this modiﬁed version of the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction, we maintain a vector
of discounts on buyers in each round, starting from zero. In every round t of the auction,
the discount of buyer i is updated by |Q(pt)| − |Q(pt
−i)|. From Proposition 6, this is the
diﬀerence between the increase in revenue in the main economy and the increase in revenue
in the marginal economy without buyer i.
It is important to observe that for any buyer i, the discount (henceforth, denoted by
κi) can increase or decrease or remain the same across rounds of the auction. For instance,
consider a scenario when the minimally universally undersupplied set is a singleton set {k}.
If k is not in any of the revenue maximizing allocations of the main economy, then the revenue
of the main economy will not increase. But k can be in the revenue maximizing allocation
of a marginal economy. This can increase the revenue of that marginal economy and thus
decrease the discount of the corresponding buyer. An analogous analysis explains how the
discount can increase in some rounds. If the value |Q(pt)| − |Q(pt
−i)| is positive (negative),
then it indicates crediting (debiting) to the price in a particular round. This is illustrated
with an example in Table 2 in Section 4.3. Thus, we have both crediting and debiting. We
call this variant of the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction the primal-dual credit-debit
auction. We give a formal deﬁnition below.
Deﬁnition 14 (Primal-Dual Credit-Debit Auction) The primal-dual credit-debit
auction is deﬁned as follows:
S0 The auction starts at the zero price vector. Set the initial discounts of buyers to zero:
κi = 0 for all i ∈ B.
S1 In round t of the auction, with price vector pt:
S1.1 Collect demand sets of buyers at price vector pt.
S1.2 If pt is a UCE price vector, then go to Step S2.
S1.3 Else, select a set of minimally universally undersupplied buyers Kt ⊆ B+(pt) who
see a price increase.
S1.3 If i ∈ Kt and S ∈ Di(pt), then p
t+1
i (S) := pt
i(S) + 1. Else, p
t+1
i (S) := pt
i(S).
S1.4 For every buyer i ∈ B, update the discount κi as κi := κi +
h
|Q(pt)| − |Q(pt
−i)|
i
.
Repeat from Step S1.1.
S2 The auction ends with the ﬁnal allocation of the auction being any X ∈ L∗(p) and ﬁnal
payment of every buyer i ∈ B being pi(Xi)−κi, where p is the ﬁnal price vector of the
auction.
13We show in the Appendix that the minimally universally undersupplied buyers is the solution to a linear
program and the change in revenue of every economy in a round can be found from the solution of the same
linear program.
24Using Theorems 3 and 5, we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The primal-dual credit-debit auction achieves the VCG outcome for general
valuations and truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
It is interesting to compare this clinching and unclinching auction with that due to
Ausubel [1], for the case of substitutes valuations, and from which we adopt our terminology.
Ausubel also calculates the Vickrey payments dynamically (during the auction) through the
use of“crediting”and“debiting”payments. Thus, the prices in both the primal-dual credit-
debit auction and Ausubel’s auction do not reﬂect the actual payment of buyers, rather
the payment information of buyers is calculated dynamically as an adjustment to the price.
However, Ausubel’s auction is not a uQCE-invariant auction because the auction does not
maintain a single price path but rather each buyers faces multiple price paths. There is no
single ﬁnal price vector that corresponds to a UCE price vector. Multiple price paths also
allow Ausubel to adopt linear and anonymous prices for each path. We already established
the impossibility of such simple prices within the class of auctions that we study, even for
substitutes valuations.
4.3 An Example
Consider the example in Table 1 (b) in which the BAS condition fails. The progress of
the primal-dual credit-debit auction in this example is illustrated in Table 2. The columns
corresponding to buyers show prices on bundles. The bundles which have prices in (·) are
in the demand set of the respective buyers. The seller’s revenue in economy E(M) for
M ∈ {B,B−1,B−2,B−3} is shown in every round. In the last column, we show the update
to the discounts of each buyer. Observe that the discount of each buyer (weakly) increases
in every round except from round 3 to round 4. The auction ends at a UCE price vector in
8 rounds.
5 Extending the iBundle Auction
In Parkes [24] (also see Parkes and Ungar [27]), an auction called iBundle was designed. The
auction is also designed within a linear programming framework, but is distinguished from
the auction of de Vries et al. [11] in that the price adjustment step in each round is that of a
subgradient algorithm rather than a primal-dual algorithm. iBundle, like the auction of de
Vries et al. [11], is an uQCE-invariant(0) auction for the main economy.
In this section, we extend iBundle to deﬁne a uQCE-invariant auction. We call this gen-
eralization iBundle, Extend and Adjust (iBEA). The price adjustment step in this auction is
simpler than in the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction. Also, the natural perception about
auctions in practice is that losing buyers bid to increase the prices. This is the case in iBEA,
25# Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Revenues Discounts
{1} {2} {1,2} {1} {2} {1,2} {1} {2} {1,2} πs(·) κ1,κ2,κ3
1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 (0) 0,0,0,0 0,0,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {1,3}
2 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 (1) 1,1,1,1 0,0,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {2}
3 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 0 (1) 2,1,1,2 1,1,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {3}
4 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 (0) (2) 2,2,2,2 0,0,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {2}
5 (1) 0 (1) 0 (2) (2) 0 (0) (2) 3,2,2,3 1,1,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {1}
6 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) (2) 0 (0) (2) 4,2,2,4 2,2,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {2,3}
7 (2) 0 (2) 0 (3) (3) 0 (1) (3) 5,3,3,5 2,2,0
A minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers: {2,3}
8 (2) 0 (2) 0 (4) (4) (0) (2) (4) 14 6,4,4,6 2,2,0
Universal overdemand does not hold. A UCE price vector is found
Final allocation: {{1},{2},∅}; Final payment: (0,2,0)
Table 2: Progress of the primal-dual credit-debit auction in an example for which buyers are
not substitutes.
in which the adjusted buyers in each round are a set of losing buyers of some economy but
is not the case in the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction.
To describe iBundle, we reiterate that ρ(M,pM) denotes a minimum set of buyers from
M who cannot be satisﬁed at price pM in any allocation in L∗(pM). iBundle chooses such a
set of buyers as the adjusted buyers. iBundle terminates as soon as CE prices of the main
economy is reached and with no discount to buyers from the ﬁnal prices.
To deﬁne iBEA as a uQCE-invariant auction, we need to deﬁne the adjusted buyers for
this auction:
Deﬁnition 15 (Price Adjustment Rule II) The adjusted buyers for iBEA are found
in round t as follows:
• Select an economy E(M) (M ∈ B) for which ρ(M,pt
M) 6= ∅. Then ρ(M,pt
M) is the set
of adjusted buyers.
Call the selected economy the pivot economy. In this deﬁnition, an economy that is not
yet in CE is selected at random in each round and prices of a minimal set of unsatisﬁed
buyers in that economy are adjusted. Using Theorems 3 and 5, the following corollary is
immediate.
14Buyer 3 also demands ∅ in this round.
26Corollary 4 iBEA achieves the VCG outcome for general valuations and truthful bidding
is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
The following properties of uQCE-invariant auctions allow for a simpliﬁcation to the
deﬁnition of iBEA.
Lemma 2 Consider a round t of a uQCE-invariant auction where the price vector pt is
adjusted. If pt
M is a CE price vector of economy E(M) for some M ∈ B, then p
t+1
M is also a
CE price vector of economy E(M).
Proof: Let Ut be the set of adjusted buyers in round t of the uQCE-invariant auction.
By deﬁnition, (Ut ∩ M) ⊆ M+(pt). Since price increase in a uQCE-invariant auction is by
unity, the maximum revenue increase of the seller is |Ut ∩ M|. Let (pt
M,X) be a CE of
economy E(M). Since (Ut ∩ M) ⊆ M+(pt), Xi ∈ Di(pt) for every i ∈ (Ut ∩ M). By the
price adjustment in uQCE-invariant auctions, the increase in revenue from allocation X in
economy E(M) is |(Ut ∩ M)|. This means, X remains revenue maximizing for the seller at
price vector p
t+1
M . From Lemma 1, for every buyer i ∈ M, if Xi ∈ Di(pt), then Xi ∈ Di(pt+1).
Thus, (p
t+1
M ,X) is a CE of economy E(M). ￿
The implication of Lemma 2 is that once we realize that a CE of economy E(M) is
achieved in iBEA we will not need to consider that economy again when selecting adjusted
buyers in later rounds.
As with our ﬁrst auction, we can again implement a “sequential” variation of iBEA in
which we order the economies deﬁned in B in some sequence. Then, we consider these
economies in that order one by one. For every set of buyers M in that sequence, construct
adjusted buyers as in Deﬁnition 15 in every round of iBEA until a CE of economy E(M)
is reached. If the main economy is the ﬁrst such economy selected then buyers will know
about their ﬁnal allocation of items at the end of this phase. So, they may lose interest in
participating in later rounds of the auction because bidding in these stages does not change
their ﬁnal allocation. By making the main economy the last pivot economy this issue can be
overcome.
5.1 A Clinching Interpretation of iBEA
The clinching interpretation idea for the primal-dual credit-debit auction can also be ex-
tended to iBEA. At every round of iBEA, for every buyer i ∈ B, we can deﬁne the new
discount of i as πs(pt) − πs(pt
−i). With this, we can track the discounts of every buyer dy-
namically and apply it at the end of the auction. For an economy that has reached a CE,
the increase in revenue can be calculated from the following lemma, proof of which follows
from the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Consider a round t of a uQCE-invariant auction where the price vector pt is
adjusted. If pt is a CE price vector of economy E(M) for some M ∈ B, then the increase in
27revenue of the seller in economy E(M) is |Ut ∩ M|, where Ut is the set of adjusted buyers
in round t.
The increase in revenue of an economy that has not yet reached a CE in iBEA is more
diﬃcult to track than in the earlier auction. Now, we must explicitly calculate the revenue
in such an economy in each round, by solving an additional winner determination problem.
5.2 An Example
The example in Table 3 has three buyers and two items. The values of buyers are shown
in the third row. Subsequent rows illustrate the progress of the auction in each round.
Each row provides the prices on each bundle to each buyer, and the seller revenue in the
main economy and in each marginal economy. The bid of each buyer is indicated with
parentheses. Comments in each round indicate which allocation is selected to solve the
winner determination (WD) problem. The main economy E(B) is adopted as the initial
pivot economy. iBundle for E(B) terminates in round 7, at which point the price vector is
also a CE price vector of economies E(B−2) and E(B−3). Pivot economy E(B−1) is adopted
for the ﬁnal two rounds, at which point iBEA terminates with a UCE price vector.
6 Summary and Open Questions
We introduced a class of eﬃcient ascending price combinatorial auctions. The auctions
achieve the VCG outcome for private valuations that respect no externalities and free dis-
posal, but without requiring any additional restrictions. Truthful bidding is an ex post Nash
equilibrium for buyers. Crucially, we have relaxed the traditional deﬁnition of an ascending
price auction to allow for discounts to buyers at the end of the auction. Our relaxation retains
the simplicity of a single price path. The auctions use the concept of universal competitive
equilibrium (UCE) prices. We showed that any ascending Vickrey auction for the combi-
natorial allocation problem must terminate with a UCE price vector, and that terminating
with a UCE price vector is suﬃcient to determine the Vickrey payments.
We provided two speciﬁc examples of auctions within the general class. One of them
generalizes the auction in de Vries et al. [11] from the restricted valuation class of buyer-
submodularity (roughly equivalent to substitutes) to general valuations. The other gen-
eralizes the iBundle auction in Parkes and Ungar [27], also from the sub-class of buyer-
submodularity to general valuations. The auctions can also be viewed as a generalization
of Ausubel’s clinching [2] and credit/debit auctions [1], because we provide interpretations
for both auctions in which the ﬁnal discounts of buyers are determined dynamically across
rounds. Table 4 summarizes our contribution to the ascending price Vickrey auctions litera-
ture. Although the worst-case number of prices in our auctions is exponential in the number
of items, this cost will generally not be incurred in practice. The number of prices that must
be quoted is bounded by the number of bundles which interest the buyers. In special cases,
28Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Seller revenue
{1} {2} {1,2} {1} {2} {1,2} {1} {2} {1,2} in main and
Values 3 0 3 0 6 6 0 2 4 marginal economies
1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 (0) {0,0,0,0}
Pivot: E(B). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}. Buyer {3} is unsatisﬁed.
2 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 0 0 (1) {1,1,1,0}
Pivot: E(B). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}. Buyers {1,2} are unsatisﬁed.
3 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 0 (1) {2,1,1,2}
Pivot: E(B). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}. Buyer {3} is unsatisﬁed.
4 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 (0) (2) {2,2,2,2}
Pivot: E(B). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}. Buyer {3} is unsatisﬁed.
5 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) (1) 0 (1) (3) {3,3,3,2}
Pivot: E(B). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}. Buyers {1,2} are unsatisﬁed.
6 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) (2) (0) (1) (3) {4,3,3,4}
Pivot: E(B). WD selects {{1},{2},∅}. Buyer {3} is unsatisﬁed.
7 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) (2) (0) (2) (4) 15 {4,4,4,4}
CEs of economies E(B),E(B−2),E(B−3) are reached.
{{1},{2},∅} is an eﬃcient allocation of E(B).
Pivot: E(B−1). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}. Buyer {2} is unsatisﬁed.
8 (2) 0 (2) 0 (3) (3) (0) (2) (4) {5,4,4,5}
Pivot: E(B−1). WD selects {∅,∅,{1,2}}. Buyer {2} is unsatisﬁed.
9 (2) 0 (2) 0 (4) (4) (0) (2) (4) {6,4,4,6}
An UCE price vector is reached.
Final allocation: {{1},{2},∅}.
Final payment: p1({1}) = 2 − [6 − 4] = 0, p2({2}) = 4 − [6 − 4] = 2, p3(∅) = 0.
Table 3: Progress of iBEA for an example
like the homogeneous items/units case, the number of such bundles can be polynomial (in
the number of units).
An interesting direction for future work is to ﬁnd a characterization of valuations for
which auctions with linear and non-anonymous prices or non-linear and anonymous prices
can achieve the VCG outcome.
15Buyer 3 also demands ∅ bundle from this round onwards.
29Auctions Conditions under Number of Search for Is ﬁnal price
-Type of items- which the VCG price paths a CE of equal to ﬁnal
outcome is achieved economy payment?
Demange et al. [13] Unit demand Single Main Yes
-Heterogeneous-
Ausubel [1] Non-increasing Single Main Yes
-Homogeneous- marginal values
de Vries et al. [11] Buyers are submodular Single Main Yes
Ausubel and Milgrom [3]
-Heterogeneous-
de Vries et al. [11] General valuations Multiple Main Yes
(Modiﬁed with (but on
multiple price paths) diﬀerent
-Heterogeneous- price paths)
Ausubel [2] Gross substitutes Multiple Main and No
-Heterogeneous- marginal
Our Contribution
uQCE-invariant Buyers are substitutes Single Main No
auctions for
main economy
-Heterogeneous-
uQCE-invariant General valuations Single Main and No
auctions marginal
-Heterogeneous-
Table 4: Characteristics of Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for Multiple Items
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32Appendix: The Primal-Dual uQCE-Invariant Auction
In this section, we interpret our primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction as a primal-dual algo-
rithm. 16 We provide no new results in this section, but give an alternate (algorithmic) view
of the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction deﬁned in Section 4.
To do this, we formulate the problem of ﬁnding a UCE price vector as a linear program.
Using primal and dual feasibility with CS conditions CS-1 and CS-2, we formulate the CE of
economy E(M) for any M ⊆ B as follows (yM
i (S) = 1 denotes the allocation of bundle S to
buyer i, zM(X) = 1 denotes that the seller has selected allocation X, and the superscripts
indicate that the variables corresponding to economy E(M)):
(CE(M,p))
y
M
i (S) =
X
X∈L∗(pM):Xi=S
z
M(X) ∀ i ∈ M, ∀ S ∈ Di(p) ∪ {∅}. (5)
X
S∈Di(p)
y
M
i (S) = 1 ∀ i ∈ M
+(p). (6)
X
∅6=S∈Di(p)
y
M
i (S) ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ M \ M
+(p). (7)
X
X∈L∗(pM)
z
M(X) = 1. (8)
y
M
i (S) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ M, ∀ S ∈ Di(p) ∪ {∅}.
z
M(X) ≥ 0 ∀ X ∈ L
∗(pM).
The ﬁrst set of constraints in (5) enforce the balance of supply and demand. Constraints
(6) and (7) indicate the demand in the economy, with buyers assigned to bundles in their
demand set only. Constraint (8) indicates the supply, with a seller selecting an allocation
that maximizes his payoﬀ and is compatible with the demands of the buyers. Any allocation
in L∗(pM) is such an allocation, by deﬁnition. If the linear program is feasible at price vector
p, then pM is a CE price vector of economy E(M). If the linear program is feasible at price
vector p for every M ∈ B, then p is also a UCE price vector.
In the spirit of a primal-dual algorithm, we can construct a restricted primal problem for
formulation (P(M)). This is already achieved in de Vries et al. [11], who adopt a primal-dual
algorithm for the main economy to design their auction. In our formulation, we combine the
restricted primal problems of the main economy and every marginal economy and maintain
a single price vector (a set of dual variables) for the main and the marginal economies. This
yields a uQCE-invariant auction.
Formally, our restricted primal is introduced by relaxing the CE formulation (CE(M,p))
by introducing artiﬁcial variables (δM) into constraints (6) for every M ∈ B. Using this, we
16Papadimitriou and Steiglitz [23] provide a useful text-book treatment of the family of primal-dual algo-
rithms.
33deﬁne the quasi-CE price vector in an alternative manner using a set of linear inequalities:
Deﬁnition 16 (Quasi-CE Price) A price vector p is a quasi-CE price vector of econ-
omy E(M) for some M ⊆ B, if there is a feasible solution to (CE(M,p)) with constraints
(6) relaxed to:
X
S∈Di(p)
y
M
i (S) + δ
M
i = 1 ∀ i ∈ M
+(p) (QUASI(M,p))
δ
M
i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ M
+(p).
The eﬀect of the relaxation is to allow the seller to still select a revenue maximizing
allocation from L∗(pM), but to relax constraints (6) so that having buyers who are not
allocated a bundle from their respective demand sets can be allowed. In particular, in a
solution for which all artiﬁcial variables (δM
i ) are zero, p is a CE price vector of economy
E(M), and if such feasible solutions exist for every M ∈ B then p is also a UCE price vector.
The relaxed formulation is useful because it is always feasible as long as L∗(pM) is non-
empty (since values for variables yM,zM,δM can then be chosen to attain feasibility). Now,
denote the feasible region of (QUASI(M,p)) at price vector p as F(M,p). Our restricted
primal problem introduces these artiﬁcial variables for economy E(M) for every M ∈ B and
tries to minimize their summed value. Combining the feasible regions of (QUASI(M,p))
in economies E(M) for every M ∈ B, we can write the following restricted primal for any
K ⊆ B+(p):
∆(K,p) = max−
X
M∈B
X
i∈K∩M+(p)
δ
M
i . (RP(K,p))
s.t. (y
M,z
M,δ
M) ∈ F(M,p) ∀ M ∈ B.
If buyer i has δM
i = 0 for all M ∈ B, we call i a satisﬁed buyer. Else, i is called an
unsatisﬁed buyer.
The feasible region of (RP(K,p)) is the union of feasible regions of (QUASI(M,p)) for
all M ∈ B. For any K ∈ B+(p), the value of the objective function indicates the number
of buyers from K that cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously in the main economy as well as
in every marginal economy. Formulation (RP(K,p)) is feasible if p a uQCE price vector.
Observe that the feasible region of (RP(K,p)) is independent of the choice of K ⊆ B+(p).
Any uQCE-invariant auction will start with a feasible solution to (RP(K,p)), and iden-
tify adjusted buyers to maintain a uQCE price vector. Observe that if ∆(K,p) < 0, then
for some M ⊆ B, K is a set of undersupplied buyers in economy E(M). This gives us
an alternate deﬁnition of universally undersupplied buyers, which is useful to interpret our
auction as a primal-dual algorithm.
Deﬁnition 17 (Universally Undersupplied Buyers) A set of buyers K ⊆ B+(p) is
universally undersupplied at price vector p if p is a uQCE price vector and ∆(K,p) < 0.
34Given a universally undersupplied set of buyers K, it is suﬃcient that ∆(K−i,p) = 0 for
every i ∈ K for K to be minimally universally undersupplied. This can be seen from the
fact that the feasible region of (RP(K,p)) is independent of K. Thus, at any price vector p,
a feasible solution of (RP(K−i,p)) is also feasible for RP(K0,p) for every K0 ⊆ K−i. Now,
consider the optimal solution of (RP(K−i,p)) at price vector p for which ∆(K−i,p) = 0. For
any K0 ⊆ K−i, this solution is also feasible for (RP(K0,p)) and ∆(K0,p) = 0.
Given the restricted primal formulation we can proceed to deﬁne our adjusted buyers. If
the optimal solution to (RP(B+(p),p)) is zero, we have found a UCE price vector and we
stop. Else, we look for the dual of (RP(K,p)) for some universally undersupplied buyers
K ⊆ B+(p) to deﬁne a class of adjusted buyers.
We note that the primal problem for which we are solving the primal-dual algorithm is
simply the eﬃcient allocation problem of the main economy and every marginal economies
combined together. So, the dual of such a primal problem will have a separate price variable
(and payoﬀ variables for the buyers and the seller) for every economy. Thus, the dual of
our restricted primal should give diﬀerent price adjustment directions for each of these price
vectors. But, what we show is that the same price adjustment (and thus payoﬀ adjustments)
is made across all economies. This is possible because of the starting dual feasible solution
we take and the way we do price adjustment. Thus, and starting from a single price vector
for all economies, our price adjustment direction allows us to maintain a single price vector
for the main and for every marginal economy throughout the auction.
At any price vector p, if ∆(B+(p),p) = 0, then the auction (primal-dual algorithm) can
terminate. Otherwise, we ﬁnd an optimal solution to the dual of (RP(K,p)), for some
K ⊆ B+(p) for which ∆(K,p) < 0, which is the following formulation:
∆(K,p) = min
X
M∈B
h
λ
M +
X
i∈M
θ
M
i
i
. (DRP(K,p))
s.t.
θ
M
i + ρ
M
i (S) ≥ 0 ∀ M ∈ B, ∀ i ∈ M, ∀ S ∈ Di(p).
λ
M − ρ
M
i (Xi) ≥ 0 ∀ M ∈ B, ∀ X ∈ L
∗(pM).
θ
M
i ≥ 0 ∀ M ∈ B, ∀ i ∈ M \ (K ∩ M
+(p)).
θ
M
i ≥ −1 ∀ M ∈ B, ∀ i ∈ K ∩ M
+(p).
ρ
M
i (∅) ≥ 0 ∀ M ∈ B, ∀ i ∈ M
+(p),
Variable λM will be interpreted as the change in revenue of the seller in economy E(M)
in this round, and θM
i will be interpreted as the change in payoﬀ of buyer i. An optimal
solution to this problem provides the direction in which we adjust prices in the auction:
Lemma 4 If p is a uQCE price vector, then for any universally undersupplied set of buyers
K ⊆ B+(p), there is an optimal solution to (DRP(K,p)) such that ρM
i (S) = 1 ∀ M ∈
B, ∀ i ∈ K ∩ M+(p), ∀ S ∈ Di(p) and ρM
i (S) = 0 otherwise.
35Proof: For any M ∈ B, we say a buyer i ∈ M is satisﬁed in economy E(M) if δM
i = 0 in
the optimal solution of restricted primal (RP(K,p)). Let Q(pM) denote the set of satisﬁed
buyers from set K∩M+(p) in economy E(M) for every M ∈ B at price vector p. This means
that at optimality of (RP(K,p)) we have,
∆(K,p) =
X
M∈B
h
|Q(pM)| − |K ∩ M
+(p)|
i
. (9)
Set θM
i = −1 for all i ∈ K∩M+(p) and θM
i = 0 otherwise for every M ∈ B. Set λM = |Q(pM)|
for every M ∈ B. This is clearly feasible for (DRP(K,p)) and optimal using Equation 9. ￿
Lemma 4 shows that the particular set of adjusted buyers in the primal-dual uQCE-
invariant auction is an optimal solution of the dual of an appropriate restricted primal and
thus deﬁnes a primal-dual price adjustment direction. This gives an algorithmic justiﬁcation
for the price adjustment.
There is still some ﬂexibility in exactly how to adjust prices, because Lemma 4 allows one
to choose any set of universally undersupplied buyers on which to adjust prices. For instance,
the largest universally undersupplied set of buyers is B+(p), but there can be smaller sets.
We choose to adjust the prices on a minimally universally undersupplied set of buyers
for reasons explained earlier in Section 3.5. Thus, a minimally universally undersupplied set
of buyers deﬁne a class of adjusted buyers. This in turn deﬁnes a uQCE-invariant auction
using a primal-dual algorithm which is the primal-dual uQCE-invariant auction.
Appendix: Some Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: Let p be the price vector in the auction in some round. We will show that bidding
strategy of every buyer is consistent in each round t till this round. By bundle monotonicity,
for every buyer i / ∈ B+(p), we have Di(p) = Ω. Also, by round monotonicity, if a bundle
S / ∈ Di(p), then pi(S) = 0. Now, construct the valuation proﬁle v￿ (using p) as follows. For
every buyer i ∈ B+(p),
v
￿
i(S) =
￿
pi(S) + ￿ ∀ S ∈ Di(p)
pi(S) = 0 otherwise
for some small ￿ > 0. For every buyer i ∈ B \ B+(p), construct valuation, v￿
i, as
v
￿
i(S) = pi(S) ∀ S ∈ Di(p) = Ω
Consider a buyer i and any bundle S ∈ Ω. If S ∈ Di(p), then by bundle monotonicity for
every T ⊇ S, we have T ∈ Di(p). From, the starting price vector and round monotonicity,
pi(T) ≥ pi(S). This implies vi(T) ≥ vi(S). If S / ∈ Di(p), by round monotonicity and
36starting price vector, we get pi(S) = 0 and thus vi(S) = 0. So, for every T ⊇ S, we have
vi(T) ≥ vi(S). This shows that v￿
i is a general valuation satisfying free disposal.
For every buyer i ∈ B, every bundle S ∈ Ω and every round t of the auction, deﬁne
δt
i(S) := pi(S) − pt
i(S). Also, observe the following:
1. If S ∈ Di(pt), then S ∈ Di(p) (round monotonicity). This means, δt
i(S) = r −t, where
r denotes the number of rounds in the auction so far. So, from the deﬁnition of v￿
i, the
payoﬀ of buyer i from bundle S is: ￿ + (r − t) if i ∈ B+(p) and r − t if i / ∈ B+(p).
2. If S / ∈ Di(pt), then δt
i(S) < r − t. From the deﬁnition of v￿
i, the payoﬀ of buyer i from
bundle S is less than r − t.
These two observations show that in every round of the auction so far, v￿ is consistent with
the demand set proﬁle in that round. ￿
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: Assume that there is a buyer i which does not follow truthful bidding, while other
buyers follow truthful bidding. Buyer i has no incentive to follow a strategy which makes
the auction run inﬁnitely. So, buyer i is (weakly) better oﬀ following a strategy in which
the auction terminates. Let p be the ﬁnal price vector in the auction. From Proposition 5,
consistency is possible using activity rules RM and BM in every round of the auction.
Since bidding in every round is consistent with some valuation proﬁle, every uQCE-
invariant auction terminates ﬁnitely such that if X is the ﬁnal allocation chosen and p is the
ﬁnal price vector in the auction, then Xi ∈ Di(p) for every i ∈ B and the revenue of the
seller in the main economy is given by πs(p) =
P
i∈B pi(Xi).
Now, assume that there is some buyer i which does not follow truthful bidding strategy
whereas buyers in B−i follow truthful bidding strategy. This means, (p−i,π−i(p),πs(p−i)) is
a dual feasible solution of (D(B−i)) and, we can write the following from weak duality:
X
j∈B−i
πj(p) + π
s(p−i) ≥ V (B−i). (10)
Let Y be an eﬃcient allocation of the main economy and π
vcg
i be the Vickrey payoﬀ of buyer
37i. Now,
π
vcg
i = V (B) − V (B−i)
= vi(Yi) +
X
j∈B−i
vj(Yj) − V (B−i)
≥ vi(Xi) +
X
j∈B−i
vj(Xj) − V (B−i) (From eﬃciency of Y )
= vi(Xi) − pi(Xi) +
X
j∈B−i
[vj(Xj) − pj(Xj)] +
X
j∈B
pj(Xj) − V (B−i)
= vi(Xi) − pi(Xi) +
X
j∈B−i
πj(p) + π
s(p) − V (B−i)
≥ vi(Xi) − pi(Xi) + π
s(p) − π
s(p−i) (From Equation (10)).
But, by the payment rule of a uQCE-invariant auction, vi(Xi) − pi(Xi) + πs(p) − πs(p−i)
is the actual payoﬀ (after discount) of buyer i at the end of such an auction. This means,
buyer i is better oﬀ following the truthful bidding strategy. ￿
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